GOALS

  • hypothesis: what it is for a mental state to be conscious
  • what is the relation between state consciousness and transitive consciousness (i.e. state's property of being conscious on/off and subject's being conscious of that state)
  • role of awareness, special kind of awareness
  • HOT explains consciousness of quality, not the existence of quality (functionalist account, not ontological)
  • what-it-is-like is a result/generated as a compound, is an emergent quality
  • What it does not do
    • not about (neural) implementation; it's about functional architecture of the mind
    • explanatory gap (Levine, epistemic, not ontological like Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness) = how quality-less HOT generates there-being-something-it's-like quality of the mental state for us

Definitions & terms

THE THREE NOTIONS

Notion What it is Which states have it
Property Any feature a state has: conscious or not, duration, causes, whose state it is All mental states
Content Intentional character, aboutness: “that p”, or directed at an object Intentional states; sensory states only on the disputed representationalist view
Quality Qualitative character, what it’s like: the redness, the painfulness Sensory states only

THE STATE CATEGORIES

State Has content? Has quality? Can be nonconscious? Examples
Mental state Umbrella term Umbrella term Yes Any of the below
Intentional state Yes No (on the plain view) Yes Belief, desire, thought
Sensory state Disputed Yes Yes (Rosenthal’s key claim) Pain, red sensation, smell

Mental state

  • Mental state = roughly two main types: intentional and sensory. The open question is how we tell which of them are conscious.
  • State consciousness = a property of mental states that are conscious (or lack of), for a state to be a conscious state [= property of a mental state]
  • Sensory consciousness = A special case of a conscious state: a sensory state that is conscious, with at least two properties, a sensory quality and the property of state consciousness.
  • Intentional state = A mental state with content, such as a belief or desire. It is quality-less, can be unconscious
  • Sensory state = A mental state with a sensory quality. According to the author it can occur without our being conscious of it.

Subject

  • CREATURE consciousness = being aware, receptive that is normal for waking state (consciousness as biological matter)
  • Transitive consciousness = for us to be conscious of something; for us to be conscious of something: any object in the mind, whether a thought or sensory data. A relation. Independent of state consciousness, but related to it.
  • Awareness = Being aware of something and being conscious of it are the same, used interchangeably. Awareness of a state is necessary for the state to be conscious but not sufficient: there must be a special way of being aware.
  • Introspective consciousness = when accompanying HOT is a conscious thought
  • Non-introspective consciousness = Ordinary state consciousness, where the accompanying HOT is not itself conscious.
  • Phenomenal consciousness = What it is like for one to be in a particular state (Block).
  • Access consciousness = A state whose content is used as a premise in reasoning and for the rational control of action and speech (Block). Rosenthal accepts conscious states with nothing it is like, such as thoughts, but denies phenomenal consciousness without access.
  • Attention = Different from awareness. States can be conscious without attention but cannot be conscious without awareness.

Brief summary of the paper, per section

I. State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness

  • definitions of state consciousness and transitive consciousness, separate but not independent
    • one belongs to the state as a property, one belongs to a subject as a process
  • for the mental state to be conscious, we must be to some extent aware of it
  • Being aware of a state is NOT a sufficient condition for that state to be a conscious state
  • necessary and sufficient condition for a mental state to be conscious = a particular way where we are aware of our mental states when those states are conscious states

II. Hypothesis

  • transitive consciousness appears to be immediate = no mediation, direct
  • two kinds of transitive awareness
    • perceptual model = what we see, hear, perceive in some way
    • thinking model = we are conscious of something due to having a thought about it
  • theory of consciousness must explain qualitative dimension of sensory states
    • either by higher order perception or by higher order thought
    • Rosenthal rejects higher-order sensing/perception

III. Sensory consciousness

  • a special case of conscious state, they have sensory quality;
  • sensory consciousness = sensory state = conscious state with [at least] two qualities: sensory quality and property of state consciousness
  • sensory quality of sensory states is essential/intrinsic to them; therefore, sensory states have sensory quality as a property whether they are conscious or not (e.g. subliminal)
  • Author argues that it is possible to have sensory states that we are not conscious of. It goes against the predominant notion that sensory qualities can occur only if we are conscious of them
    • Arguments: subliminal perception, peripheral vision = involve sensory perception of which we are not aware
  • Ned Block: phenomenal and access consciousness
    • phenomenal consciousness = what it is like for one to be in a particular state
    • access consciousness = content of which is used as a premise in reasoning and for rational control and action... and speech
    • but Rosenthal: there is no phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness

IV. HOT and what it's like

  • when sensory state is conscious => there is what-it-is-like-to-be-in-that-state quality
  • how can one's being in an intentional state produce/result in there being something-it-is-like of being in that state
  • i.e. how can quality-less HOT explain what-it-is-like to experience those sensory states
  • Sensory quality = intrinsic to sensory mental state
  • What it's like = HOT representation of sensory mental state and its sensory qualities
    • = What it's like is an outcome of the interaction between the sensory mental state and HOT; it's a result of a process of HOT representing particular sensory qualities (redness, pain, smells) of sensory mental state

Relation between HOTs and Sensory qualities

  • learning new concepts for our experiences of gustatory and olfactory properties (of wine) typically leads to being conscious of more fine-grained differences among the qualities
  • similar to music and artistic experiences => new concepts enable new conscious experiences, more finely differentiated sensory qualities => new concepts generate new conscious sensory qualities
    • two possibilities
      • 1) new concepts generate new properties of the states [REJECTED IN THE ARTICLE]
      • 2) new concepts enable recognition of existing properties of the states [but previously not recognizable]
        • so we already had those qualities/properties of the mental states but we were not conscious of them?
        • Concepts allow us to form intentional states that have a certain range of contents
        • Contents of our intentional states must make a difference to which sensory qualities can occur consciously
        • New concepts that make possible the conscious experience of certain qualities ARE CONCEPTS OF THOSE QUALITIES
        • Thoughts about concepts/qualities => lead to having sensory experience of those qualities?
  • => HOTs about qualities are prerequisite of having conscious experience of those qualities
  • HOTs have no qualitative properties [according to Rosenthal], but can make a difference in what qualitative properties of sensory states and what-it-is-like for us to experience such sensory state
  • EXAMPLE: Oboe, hearing, woodwinds

V. Consciousness, Confabulations, and function

  • implications of HOT hypothesis: misinterpretations and informational-richness
  • HOT that accompanies sensory state can be fine-grained based on HOT but also additional factors
    • size of repertoire of concepts
    • current interests
    • how attentive one is
    • how experienced one is in making relevant sensory discriminations
  • HOT determines what it-is-like for one to be in a sensory state => can misrepresent the sensory state
  • Confabulations/Misinterpretations
    • EXAMPLE: dental patients, pain
    • EXAMPLE: Daniel Dennett, Marilyns in Warhol’s famous paintings, we are aware of them as clear and focused, although they are not
    • EXAMPLE: misrepresenting beliefs, desires for unacceptable things
  • Informational richness
    • Less rich = EXAMPLE woods, branches, only sensations of undifferentiated rustic environment, only relevant part of the environment
    • Richer = EXAMPLE Marilyns by Warhol, informationally less rich states are experienced richer due to HOT representing them richer
  • Function
    • Dretske's objection: if state being conscious is just that a subject is transitively conscious of the state, it does not
    • “Dretske has noted that theories on which a state’s being conscious consists in one’s being transitively conscious of the state seem unable to explain how a mental state’s being conscious could have any function. Being transitively conscious of a state, on these theories, makes no difference to the state’s nonrelational properties. So the state’s being conscious will make no difference to its causal role nor, therefore, to its function.” (p. 416)
    • HOT (= it is a subset of transitive consciousness) adds to the mental state toggling of the property "conscious" and also the causal role of a mental state being conscious is in the interaction between the mental state and HOT representing it

Reconstruction of the main argument

  • Mental states are intentional or sensory, and any of them can be conscious/non-conscious.
  • Question: what makes a mental state conscious (state consciousness)?
  • Being aware of the state is necessary but not sufficient for the state to be conscious, since inferential awareness leaves it non-conscious.
  • So it takes a special kind of awareness: a thought, not sensing (higher-order sensing is rejected).
  • HOT is the subset of transitive consciousness that is about one’s own state and is noninferential, occurrent and assertoric.
  • Sensory qualities belong to the sensory state, conscious or not (subliminal and peripheral perception).
  • What it’s like is that quality as represented by the HOT, so the HOT co-determines it and can misrepresent it.

Why awareness of a state is not enough to make it conscious

  • 01 Awareness is necessary
    • Being completely unaware of a state is enough for it not to be conscious. So every conscious state is one we are aware of.
  • 02 But it is not sufficient
    • We can be aware of a state while it stays non-conscious.
    • EXAMPLE: being annoyed without being aware/conscious of it; you may still not feel it, but are aware of it
    • Awareness by 1) inference 2) direct/immediate
  • 03 Rule out wrong kind of awareness
    • Remove that awareness that leaves mental states not-conscious (i.e. by inference)
    • Whatever remains is the special/particular kind of awareness needed for states being conscious
  • 04 What properties must this awareness have?
    • Non-inferential: awareness through conscious inference (testimony, behaviour, theory) does not make the state conscious.
    • Occurrent: a disposition to think about the state does not make us aware of it now.
    • Assertoric: direct knowledge of it being true (no doubts etc)
    • A thought, not sensing: higher-order sensing is rejected.
  • 05 Therefore => HOT hypothesis
    • A state is conscious when it is accompanied by a non-inferential, occurrent, assertoric thought that one is in that state.

Why higher order sensing is rejected

  • the qualitative aspect of higher order sensing would need explanation as well => postponing the problem
  • "the qualitative aspect of this higher-order perceiving would itself need to be explained in turn." (p. 409)
  • Rosenthal rejects existence of second-order (higher order) sensory qualities. What are they?
  • Higher order qualitative states are not the same, nor distinct => then, those higher order states have no qualitative properties at all => therefore, they are not sensory states (only those have qualitative property) => therefore, they must be intentional (per definition no quality-less states) states

Transitive and state consciousness: how they relate

  • Mental state
    • Ontology
      • mental state is an entity independent of the subject being conscious of it
      • it is an entity with properties
      • mental state as an entity has three main categories of properties
        • Property (all mental states)
          • conscious
          • causal effect(s)
          • duration
          • of whom
          • other...
        • Content (aboutness, intentional states only, some argue sensory as well)
        • Quality (what-it-is-like, sensory states only)
    • State consciousness
      • = a mental state whose property "conscious" is true
    • How is mental state.conscious changed/actualized?
  • Transitive consciousness
    • belongs to a subject
    • actualizes via HOT the mental state property "conscious"
  • In other words, the state consciousness as a property of a mental state, i.e. "S.conscious = true" gets its values by virtue of the value being a result of a function
  • S.conscious = exists h: HOT(h, S) and (h.noninferential and h.occurrent and h.assertoric)

Speculation, new symbols extend our intentional states and thus perception and thus experience

  • new concepts enable recognition of existing properties of the states [but previously not recognizable]
    • so we already had those qualities/properties of the mental states but we were not conscious of them?
    • Concepts allow us to form intentional states that have a certain range of contents
    • Contents of our intentional states must make a difference to which sensory qualities can occur consciously
    • New concepts that make possible the conscious experience of certain qualities ARE CONCEPTS OF THOSE QUALITIES
    • Thoughts about concepts/qualities => lead to having sensory experience of those qualities?
  • => HOTs about qualities are prerequisite of having conscious experience of those qualities
  • New concepts are obtained by our experience
  • Our experience is shaped by the world and objects in it
  • Objects in the world, i.e. material culture or technology, shape our experience
  • Our experience, mediated by technology/material culture, gives us new concepts (linguistic/mathematical/programming/music notation = symbolic, perceptual)
  • These new concepts literally enable us to recognize, sometimes for the first time, qualities of sensory states => richer experience (CONCEPTS ==> NEW EXPERIENCE)
  • By feedback loop, new sensory states enable us to come up with new concepts (NEW EXPERIENCE => NEW CONCEPTS)